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U

.S. hospitals and physicians
have been known to charge
uninsured patients and patients re
ceiving care outside their healthplan networks an average of 2.5
times what most health insurers
pay and more than 3 times their
actual costs.1 Controversy over
list prices triggered more than
120 lawsuits in 2004 and 2005,2
and the debate has found new
relevance with increased calls in
Congress for pricing transparen
cy and the requirement in the Af
fordable Care Act (ACA) that
nonprofit hospitals publicize their
discounting policies for unin
sured patients. The theory of im
plied contracts, a foundation in
most first-year courses in contract
law, offers a useful legal and eth
ical mechanism for handling these
troubling problems in health care
billing.
A staple law-school hypotheti
cal illustrates the usual function
of implied contracts: a physician
encounters an unconscious strang
er in the street who requires im
mediate medical attention. The
physician promptly gives the
stranger the requisite emergency
care and later submits a bill for
her services. Is she entitled to
payment?
According to elementary con
tract principles, she is. Had the
stranger been conscious and
able to negotiate a contract be
fore he required medical atten
tion, he clearly would have con
sented to purchase the medical
services. When parties are un
able to negotiate — because of
insufficient time or the inability
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to communicate, for example —
the law imputes an “implied con
tract,” creating a legal obligation
that mimics one created by mu
tual assent.3
This legal argument is usually
invoked to enforce payment for
medical services to which patients
cannot expressly consent, but the
logic of implied contracts works
both ways: just as the law im
putes an obligation to pay, it
similarly imputes a price — that
to which the patient and provider
would have agreed. The doctrine
thus limits the amount that pro
viders can reasonably expect to
receive to the prevailing market
price. Accordingly, an impliedcontracts approach informs the
way the law should handle accu
sations that providers use “list
prices” to overcharge patients.
In a profession that places a
high premium on informed con
sent, there are several reasons
why providers do not obtain
meaningful “informed financial
consent” from patients before en
tering into financial agreements.
Long-standing professional norms
prevent discussion of fees before
a physician cares for the sick,
and enormous accounting com
plexity causes both providers and
patients to lack the capacity to
negotiate and assent to a bill. But
the profession’s failure to insist
on informed financial consent
has both triggered sharp criticism
and fueled untamed health care
prices, necessitating a better ap
proach to assigning prices in con
tracts for health care services.
There are at least four mecha
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nisms that can help solve the
problem of excessive list-price
billing. The first, which could be
labeled a “market-based approach,”
is to require greater disclosure of
providers’ prices. Policy scholars
have argued that greater billing
transparency would enhance price
competition among providers, and
calls for more public reporting of
average or list charges are gain
ing momentum. Although such
aggregated reporting does little
to help patients understand their
financial options at the bedside,
it offers the hope that greater
transparency will bring list prices
down to competitive levels.
A second approach, which ap
peals to professionalism, empha
sizes that physicians and perhaps
hospitals owe fiduciary duties to
their patients. Medical ethics has
traditionally separated the delivery
of care from ordinary market
place mores and profit-maximiz
ing pricing. Building on this tra
dition, professional ethics could
require providers to set prices that
explicitly consider the interests of
their patients as consumers with
limited resources. Australia’s med
ical profession has assumed this
fiduciary role. In response to
growing concern that providers
were charging patients with pri
vate insurance 50 to 100% more
than those covered only by the
government, Australian doctors
committed to telling patients in
advance (when possible) how
much they would pay out of pock
et for a chosen course of treat
ment.4 As a result, more than
half of privately insured Austra
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lian patients with planned hos
pital admissions in 2007 gave fi
nancial consent to prices their
providers specified in advance.5
A third approach is price reg
ulation. Section 9007 of the ACA,
for example, recognizes that list
prices frequently do not reflect
market forces and thus requires
tax-exempt hospitals to collect
from low-income uninsured pa
tients “not more than the amounts
generally billed to individuals who
have insurance.” Some state laws
use similar mechanisms but with
alternative benchmarks. A Cali
fornia law, passed in 2006, caps
charges for the uninsured on the
basis of Medicare rates, and a
2008 Illinois law links such caps
to the cost of care. These regula
tory approaches are consistent
with a more broadly held belief
that price regulation is necessary
to correct certain market failures
in health care, but they offer solu
tions only to uninsured patients
in nonprofit hospitals and do not
address the larger problems of
billing for out-of-network care.
A fourth approach — the sim
plest and most preferable one, in
our view — follows a logic akin
to that of implied contracts. An
implied-contracts approach would
obligate a patient to pay whatever
amount a prudent patient and
provider would have agreed to,
given appropriate time and infor
mation. The best proxy for in
formed bargaining is what simi
larly situated consumers and
providers actually bargain for —
namely, the rates negotiated be
tween providers and private in
surers. After all, insurers are
purchasers that possess sufficient
information and options to nego
tiate market rates. Another use

ful proxy might be Medicare re
imbursement rates, because those
rates — offered by the govern
ment and accepted by providers,
who are permitted to refuse —
also approximate the lower end
of the range of prices that a rea
sonably informed negotiation
would produce.
An implied-contracts approach
prevents overbilling of both un
insured patients and patients who
receive care outside negotiated
networks. It also offers a method
for defining widespread and inten
tionally ambiguous price terms
found in the fine print of con
tracts that litter the health care
marketplace, such as “usual” or
“customary” prices. The law fre
quently fills in the gaps in am
biguous or incomplete contracts,
not only when negotiations are
impossible (as when an uncon
scious patient requires emergency
care) but also when parties, for
whatever reason, fail to produce
fully specified contracts.
It is U.S. medicine’s discom
fort with discussing prices —
and, it must be said, the finan
cial advantages of doing business
this way — that makes so many
medical contracts incomplete. Yet
the law permits only what simi
larly situated parties would have
agreed to if negotiations had
been complete, not what provid
ers say is their individual custom.
Contractual incompleteness gives
neither providers nor patients a
general license to fill in the con
tractual gaps however they like
after medical services are provid
ed; instead, it enforces the con
tract that both parties would have
created themselves if time and
capacity had permitted.
It is time to revisit some of
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the billing practices that have
brought us to a state of finan
cial crisis in health care, and the
decoupling of the relationship be
tween price and service is among
the health care market’s biggest
problems. Establishing informed
financial consent as an essential
element of medical practice would
both fulfill the profession’s ethi
cal commitment to patient auton
omy and provide a much-needed
market-based counterforce to price
escalation. But until that happens,
the doctrine of implied contracts
can and should be used to curtail
some of the most abusive billing
practices.
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